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1. Introduction 
This bachelor thesis deals with the British political mood towards European Union called 
Euroscepticism. It is focused on the historical development and changes of this idea in 
different governmental bodies in Great Britain and the central objective is to discover 
whether there has been an increase in euroscepticism and to define the stages of the 
development of this idea. The additional purpose of this work is to discover whether 
there is the possibility of a referendum about Britain's continued membership of the EU. 
Euroscepticism is a widely known political phenomenon, which is characterized by an 
opposition towards the European integration process. Eurosceptic positions and 
definitions range from criticism of particular aspects of the EU but still remaining 
sympathetic to the idea of European integration (soft version) to the outright rejection of 
membership (hard version) (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 6). This political movement is 
widespread in different European countries and among different governments, but its 
roots stem from British political life.  
The first part of this work examines the variety of definitions of euroscepticism given by 
different authors. The thesis attempts to define what euroscepticism means, how it 
emerged, how this process can be operationalized and possible implications on the 
British political arena. However, it should be stated that there is no agreement on 
definition and so one definition, that of Taggart and Szczerbiak, has been chosen as the 
central argument for understanding euroscepticism in this work. 
In the second chapter readers can explore the eurosceptic movement in particular 
governments from the 1970s to the present day. This chapter provides an analysis of the 
critical course, based on the operationalization of this term and examines the notions of 
different executive bodies towards European integration. The consideration of this 
information will help to achieve the main goal of the thesis – to delineate euroscepticism 
and discover whether there has been a linear or non-linear growth of this movement. The 
thesis provides basic arguments such as who the eurosceptics are and how they have 
affected Britain's relationship with the EU. Also it should be noted that the second 
chapter deals with British euroscepticism from the 1970s, when the question about 
quitting the EC was first opened, and when even a referendum was held. It is quite 
important to understand what the position of the government was, who blocked them and 
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how the political elite softened this process. The thesis subsequently discusses M. 
Thatcher’s first and second terms of office, and explores the reasons for the PM’s 
transformation into a eurosceptical politician. The next thing mentioned in the chapter is 
the period during which the Conservative government, led by John Major, was in power. 
This time can be labelled as a time when there was a boom of euroscepticism in the 
British political arena. Despite Major's attempts to overcome this crisis and to establish a 
new agenda for Europe, the opposition in Parliament and even in the Conservative party 
itself made it impossible and ultimately led to the downfall of his government.  
The next section introduces an attempt to reassert Great Britain as a European hegemonic 
country. The Prime Minister T. Blair, and later his successor G. Brown tried to create this 
political framework and to initiate the building of huge coalitions, including both the 
West and the East as a form of opposition towards deeper integration. Labour’s main 
goal was to construct Anglo-European hegemony with a special relationship with then 
the U.S. However, this policy mainly concentrated on US-British relations, which led to 
the collapse of the idea of Anglo-European hegemony (Gifford 2008: 139–140).  
In the subchapter that follows this, the contemporary government is discussed. This 
government, led by David Cameron, is described as a eurosceptical governmental body, 
based on opposition to particular European policies. Cameron, since his earliest speeches, 
has been marked as a eurosceptical person. Indeed, he was always the one who opposed 
Labour's decisions and the common security, social, judiciary and foreign policies of the 
EU. When he came to power, he described himself as a eurosceptic albeit a practical and 
sensible one at the same time (Lee and Beech, eds., 2011: 220–222). Cameron’s speech 
in 2013, during which he discussed his agenda for Europe and gave a pledge for 
referendum, played a big part in this assertion. 
The final chapter considers the question about the possibility of a second membership 
referendum, but not before dealing with factors related to the active presence of 
euroscepticism in contemporary Britain. Of course, the most important factor, which this 
thesis highlights, is the growing voter’s support for right-wing populist parties; a fact 
seen by Taggart and Szczerbiak as a source of opposition not only to integration, but to 
the government as a whole. 
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The final subchapter represents an attempt to predict the possibility of a referendum on 
membership and deals with the efforts of eurosceptics to see their project for a 
referendum and a new Britain through to the end. This subchapter aims to achieve the 
additional purpose of this thesis and to sum up the success of the eurosceptic movement 
in the British political arena. 
This bachelor thesis is written using different study designs. Chapters 2 and 3 are based 
on a case study design. According to Petr Drulak a case study design is a detailed 
analysis of the case, which was chosen as a subject of research. Its goal is to provide a 
deep understanding or causal explanation of selected case (Drulak 2008: 33). However, 
case studies have a lot of branches and, as such, this thesis operates using both across and 
single-case studies. Single-case study provides further background information and helps 
us to understand the logic of the process and its development. The instrumental use of 
this study design brings the theoretical richness in the chapter 2, when it researches few 
definitions and different approaches towards euroscepticism. 
Across-case study design is used in the Chapter 3, when eurosceptic phenomenon is 
divided into six periods and they are described as a contrast of context. This type of case 
study is based on the method of “fuzzy set membership”, in which subjects of research 
are ranged between two figures (Drulak 2008: 72). The first figure can be marked as a 
eurosceptic, the second as a euroenthusisast. Thanks to this method could be achieved the 
main goal of this thesis – to delineate the Eurosceptic movement in particular 
governmental bodies.  
Chapter 4 is based on the “analysis of metaphors”. This study design operates with 
different methods, however the biggest part plays the discourse analysis. Analysis of 
metaphors examines several actors and creates a time limiting, in which it pays much 
attention on speeches and language of main actors (Drulak 2008: 125). Chapter 4 
eliminates Prime Minister, political elites and society as actors and operates with their 
stances and speeches during last two years, which could help to achieve thesis’ secondary 
goal. 
As this work illustrates the concept of euroscepticism, it could appeal to the general 
public, the academic community of social scientists or students - especially those who are 
interested in the political life of Britain. Thesis based on case study design is a kind of 
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qualitative research, that is why this work does not operate with numbers, instead of this 
it uses actor’s rhetoric and classifications. It should be noted that this thesis is based on a 
dichotomy of Euroscepticism, called hard vs. soft Euroscepticism, which will be 
described in the first chapter. 
To summarise, the main goal of this thesis is to delineate the development of 
euroscepticism during the last four decades and to clarify the possibility of a referendum. 
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2. Eurosceptic concept 
 
The phenomenon of euroscepticism crept into the mainstream in the 1990s. Historically, 
it had appeared in Britain as early as the 1970s, when a discussion about the referendum, 
concerning membership of the European Community, was started in 1975. It was 
connected with the position of so called ‘anti-marketers’ who were opposed to British 
participation in the European integration project (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 151). 
There are a number of definitions of euroscepticism which vary greatly according to their 
authors. This thesis argues that the concept is more multidimensional and thus wishes to 
explore different types of scepticism, which are prominent in British executive bodies 
today. One can even argue that euroscepticism has become a kind of 'buzzword' used by 
the media, the political elite and the academic world with a lot of different meanings and 
connotations. 
 
2.1 Definition of euroscepticism and its operationalization 
To begin with, this thesis uses Anthony Forster's definition of euroscepticism, which 
focuses on two interrelated processes – economic and political integration within Europe. 
This term is used to describe opponents of European integration concerning both 
opportunity and principles (Forster 2002: 7). R. Katz describes euroscepticism as a 
“relatively new term, although the general attitudes to which it refers – opposition to, or 
doubts about, the progress of the European project are as old as the project itself” (Katz 
in Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 151). Across the European Union there has been a 
prominent and increasingly highlighted rise in critical attitudes towards integration. 
While criticism of European integration has always existed to varying extents in different 
states, the two decades since the debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty have witnessed a more widespread and vocal sсepticism about the benefits of the 
European Union. This scepticism was evident in the 2005 referendums in France and the 
Netherlands that saw the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and in the 2008 Irish 
referendum rejection of the Lisbon Treaty.1  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Torreblanca, Jose Ignacio – Leonard, Mark, eds (2013). The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism. ECFR 
[online]. May 2013 [cit. 12. 03. 2014]. Available from http://ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf. 
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These processes can be divided by Taggart and Szczerbiak’s classification of 
Euroscepticism – soft vs. hard. Hard Euroscepticism means opposition towards 
everything about EU integration, supports a complete withdrawal from membership and 
the development of a strong national policy. The soft version of this phenomenon is 
against some specific aspects of integration into the policies of the EU, policy outcomes 
or institutional features and seeks to reform the EU rather than abolish the entire project; 
it can be referred to as 'a defence of national interest' (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 2). 
Szczerbiak and Taggart also discuss two main features of Euroscepticism. The first one is 
an extension of new policies resulting in a new populism or neo-fascism. (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak 2008: 12–13). In connection with this, Mair talks about modern politics and 
new policies, which are introduced by different points of view and represent popular 
democracy. Those steps are struggling with a constitutional one. While constitutional 
democracy needs institutional requirements for good governance, popular democracy 
depends only on the will of the people. This process causes the decline of party politics; 
parties became more dependent on different organisations and agencies, and afterwards 
are transformed into populistic units thanks to national appeal (Mair in Gifford 2008: 8-
9). The second feature lies in the position and structure of political parties and the party 
system. An example of this is the situation in which certain members of the party are 
against the EU, but in general the party is not (Gifford 2008: 6).  
In one study by Taggart and Szczerbiak, the findings were that Euroscepticism is 
frequently most likely to be adopted by protest-based parties that stand at the fringes of 
the existing party system and which are outside of government. In this view, 
Euroscepticism is part of a more general opposition to existing political systems and 
leadership structures and may be adopted by these protest-parties or populist-parties in 
order to secure electoral support. Taggart further argues that these parties are structures, 
which adopted the EU issue as a secondary appropriative issue to strengthen their 
position among the political core  (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008: 256-258). 
Another effort to define the entire range of Eurosceptic possibilities is built on the 
distinction between European integration as an ideal, and the European Union as an 
existing set of institutions.  Kopecky and Mudde describe Euroscepticism as one of four 
ideal types produced by intersecting orientations towards the European Union (EU 
optimism/pessimism) with orientations towards the idea of European integration 
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(Europhilia /Europhobia.)  This produces four ideal types; “Eurorejects” who oppose the 
ideal of integration and the reality of the EU, “Euroenthusisasts” who support both the 
EU and the ideal of ever closer union, “Europragmatists” who do not support integration, 
but view the EU as useful, and “Eurosceptics” who support the idea of integration, but 
not its realization through the current EU.  While this conceptualization has the 
theoretical appeal of separating out Europe from the actual EU, this distinction often 
appears in actual political debate (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 301–303). 
The next author, who studied the phenomenon of euroscepticism was Agnes Alexandre-
Collier. He sees: “a Eurosceptic is someone who doubts the utility and viability of 
Economic and Political Union” (Agnes Alexandre-Collier in Forster 2002: 2). She 
defines three important parts of Euroscepticism. First, it supposes that the critique is 
related to two interconnected processes – economic and political integration. Secondly, it 
links this critique to the transformation of the EC into the EU in 1993. Finally, it implies 
that Eurosceptics can be found only in the Conservative Party. Unfortunately, nowadays 
it is evident that this definition and its variables fail (Agnes Alexandre-Collier in Forster 
2002: 2).  
Recent research conducted by Anthony Forster argues that Euroscepticism has a multi-
faceted nature, which is a key to longevity. It can be seen through different contexts, such 
as the questioning of involvement in European integration projects, doubts about 
membership of the EU community, the competence of some governmental bodies of the 
EC/the EU, disengagement and withdrawal. This study clearly shows that there is a 
strong division among sceptics (Forster 2002: 2). 
Therefore, it is quite important for every researcher to operationalize the concept of 
euroscepticism. The purpose of this process is to go into more depth with the concept of 
euroscepticism and deduce the nature or sources of various eurosceptical ideas. 
According to Katz, euroscepticism can be operationalized in absolute or relative terms. 
During studies designed to categorise people, respondents answer questions to identify 
their position on a eurosceptic scale. Scores from such studies divide respondents into 
categories such as Hard Eurosceptics, Soft Eurosceptics and Europhiles (Katz in Taggart 
and Szczerbiak, 2008: 156–160). However, the most important part during the process of 
operationalization plays putting the right question and defining the ideological 
dimension, to which this question belongs. Different authors examine a few theories 
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looking for the ideological dimension of euroscepticism. This thesis defines three main 
dimensions - economic or utilitarian approach, the question of democratic deficit and 
sovereignty dimension, one of which or even more will be substantial for the Eurosceptic 
movement in particular periods. 
According to Gabel, the calculation of expected social and economic gains and losses 
through membership exists. He calls this dimension a utilitarian approach2. The main 
argument is that the EU is driven primarily through an economic agenda and 
consequently the public evaluates it according to its achievements. Market liberalization 
provides different benefits for the EU public depending on their physical proximity to 
other EU markets and their financial and human capital (income, education etc.). These 
benefits are positively correlated with support or scepticism towards European 
integration. The investigation concludes with Gabel finding empirical evidence of 
utilitarianism as being a powerful and central aspect in explaining public opinion towards 
European integration (Gabel 1998: 336–337, 348).  
Two other authors, who discussed the support or dislike of the economic aspect of 
European integration, were Easton and Haas. Both authors argue that public concerns 
about the EU and economic benefits are connected to the efficiency of the EU system and 
whether it carries out its policies effectively as well as the effectiveness of its 
bureaucratic set-up. Naturally, this approach is not accepted by all authors, however it is 
clear that it is one of the most long-standing arguments related to public opinion (Hansen 
2008: 33–34). 
The next important appropriate aspect is the idea of democratic deficit. Like 
euroscepticism, definitions of democratic deficit are varied and a consensus or a clear-cut 
understanding of the concept does not exist. McCormick defines democratic deficit as 
“… the gap between the powers of the European institutions and the ability of European 
citizens to influence their work and decisions”.3 However, several authors have criticized 
the notion of democratic deficit. According to Moravcsik, the EU is effective and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gabel in his work tests the explanatory power of five different theories of public support for the EU i.e. cognitive 
mobilisation, political values, class partisanship, government support and utilitarian approach. He explains the role 
of every theory and finds that near utilitarian theory class partisanship and government support offers the 
explanation for the public support (Gabel 1998: 351). 
3 Torreblanca, Jose Ignacio and Leonard, Mark, eds (2013). The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism. ECFR 
[online]. May 2013. [cit. 12.3.2014]. Available from http://ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf, page 1.	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successful in large part thanks to the practice of the system of constitutional check and 
balances 4 . He believes that this system introduces itself as a democratic feature 
(Moravcsik 2002: 609–610).  
A related view is that euroscepticism is frequently based on a misunderstanding of 
developments within the European Union. In a study of the 2008 Irish referendum, for 
example, John O’Brennan highlighted Irish citizens’ ignorance of the Lisbon Treaty’s 
contents as being a significant cause of their rejection of the treaty (O’Brennan, 2009: 
270). He argues that “although the Irish remain among the most enthusiastic about EU 
membership, there remains a significant knowledge vacuum, with a large majority of 
citizens professing to know little or nothing about how decisions are made at the EU 
level and how the EU institutions function” (O’Brennan, 2009: 270). According to this 
analysis, the lack of popular understanding of the European Union and European 
integration may leave space for political groups and parties to gain support by 
misrepresenting the development of integration.  
A different approach to the operationalization of the concept of euroscepticism is 
concerned with sovereignty. In contemporary academic literature a lot of theories exist, 
which combine the eurosceptic movement with scepticism towards further integration or 
pessimism towards future reflections of European ideas. The increase in EU competency 
possibly weakens the nation state and leads to the loss of sovereignty. According to 
Anthony Coughlan, who argues that national sovereignty is undermined by EU 
institutions, “ … [i]n practice countries and peoples that surrender their sovereignty to 
the EU become ever more subject to laws and policies that serve the interests of the 
others and in particular the bigger EU States… The nation that gives up its sovereignty 
or is deprived of it, ceases to be an independent subject of international politics. It 
becomes more like a province than a nation…” (Coughlan 2004: 40).5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The system of constitutional check and balances notably includes “the separation of powers, a multi-level structure 
of decision-making and a plural executive” (Moravcsik 2002: 609). 
5  However, in the academic literature exists another point of view, which supports intergovernmental and 
supranational cooperation and seeks to explain this form of govern as an effective one. They argue, that sovereignty 
lies with the people even though the institutions that the people elected to represent their interests normally exercise 
the sovereign power. This circumscription of the sovereign state, through international norms and supranational 
institutions, finds a parallel in contemporary philosophers who attack the notion of absolute sovereignty (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2010). 
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The contemporary ability of eurosceptics to create and afterward successfully use 
resources and ideological dimensions has been a major factor in mounting an effective 
public campaign against governments. Modern twenty-first century technology provides 
easy access to a range of resources and helps people to challenge pro-European groups 
more effectively. Euroscepticism has become a campaigning force, not only a view. 
Opposition groups have begun to study all proposed EU decisions based on an analysis of 
policy-making, decisions and Treaty outcomes. All of these mean that euroscepticism has 
developed into a political trend with an enormous research base (Forster 2002: 8). 
In conclusion, it should be said, that there is no clear-cut definition of this phenomenon 
and that there is a large diversity in its characteristics. Furthermore, different approaches 
are being used to explain and map out the eurosceptic movement. This thesis, however, 
will centre around the concept of hard and soft euroscepticism, which is the most 
appropriate idea for further analysis. Of course, it is also important to factor in the 
practical part played by operationalized dimensions to better understand governmental 
opposition toward European integration. The purpose of using these theoretical concepts 
lies in finding reasons for the increase or decrease of the eurosceptical trend and also in 
drawing conclusions.  
 
2.2. Euroscepticism in Britain 	  
British Euroscepticism founded this phenomenon. Many authors conducted their research 
and tried to give a definition, date its formation and explain its popularity and rise, but 
there is still no agreement between them. This is because it is a challenge to describe a 
phenomenon, which grows fast and spreads even faster. This thesis operates with the 
most prevalent current view whilst still acknowledging others. One of the goals of this 
thesis is to highlight periods of euroscepticism in Britain, showing its growth and decline 
on a governmental level during the last four decades.  
Mark Corner argues that the birth of British Euroscepticism can be traced back to the end 
of World War Two, when the European community was still feeling the impact of such a 
brutal and unforgiving conflict. The question for Europe was how to contain Germany 
and let it grow strong again without growing dangerous. The best solution was to allow it 
to recover the European auspices. Nowhere did this have as strong an impact as in 
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Britain. The defeat of Nazi Germany for British people had been seen as a single-handed 
effort with (eventually) help from the USSR and the US, plus of course considerable 
contingents from the Empire/Commonwealth. There is no doubt that this perception still 
lives on in the British psyche. (Corner 2007: 466-468). What followed can be called a 
'first period', which emerged in Macmillan’s government, when the UK first applied to 
join the EC in 1961. This period ended with a referendum in 1975 (Forster 2002: 3). Hall, 
for example, argues that post-imperial crisis was one of the reasons, why Euroscepticism 
emerged during that period. It was characterized by the declining legitimacy of the elite, 
de-alignment, electoral volatility and the enormous rise of factionalism within the main 
political parties. It was seen as a crisis of hegemony within Britain (Hall 1979: 15–16). 
However, the overwhelming majority of scientists see the rise of this phenomenon as 
taking off in the 1980s, especially after Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges Speech, which 
brought the European issue back to the forefront. This second period, around which the 
thesis will focus, was marked by her speech and continued opposition to the Maastricht 
Treaty (Forster 2002: 3).  
Most recently, a contemporary period began with Cameron-Clegg’s government. After 
years of Blair’s attempt to reassert Britain as a bridge between Europe and the US, 
Britain found itself lost. The economic crisis in 2008 showed that European Union 
countries’ economics were underestimated. David Cameron is now trying to gain public 
support and that is why he uses this hot question in his agenda (Lee and Beech, eds. 
2011: 218).  The discussions about a possible referendum about contemporary British 
attitudes towards the EU are the second focus of this work. 
In spite of this classification, scepticism has had important indirect effects on British 
policy. Sceptics, with their strong voices, have been challenging, shaping and 
constructing the character of the British debate on Europe. They have effectively 
destabilized the political parties, effectively leading to sizeable factions in the two major 
parties – Conservatives and Labour, causing serious issues for both parties. 
Euroscepticism, with its own policy-making body, has introduced to Britain a new form 
of shadow government, which is now very strong and which has a strong influence on the 
domestic political arena (Forster 2002: 8).  
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Moreover, a close relationship with Europe and membership of the EU has had an impact 
on British business and government. It has forced them to over-concentrate on the EU, 
causing them to neglect relationships with other, potentially significant parts of the 
world. Also it has become apparent that the British government’s energy was 
concentrated on converging European neighbor economies, rather than on national 
interest in other faster growing countries (Baimbridge, Burkitt and Whyman 2006: 411). 
Ultimately, it should be said, that whilst euroscepticism is a complex phenomenon, it has 
British roots. There are a lot of classifications, which provide some important arguments 
about eurosceptics and also describe the reasons for its growth and the effects of this 
political route. The most visible effect of euroscepticism is the changing nature of British 
national and foreign policy. Each government has, unfortunately, been unable to create 
strong opposition to this movement, because of the changing nature of the eurosceptic 
movement and the vast amount of resources at its disposal. 
 
3. Euroscepticism in particular executive bodies in Britain 
The term “euroscepticism” is applicable to many EU member countries, however it has a 
rich and long history in Great Britain. Opponents of European integration have existed in 
Britain since the early stages of this process. They had different arguments and had 
different names, but their agenda was almost the same – to oppose close British 
engagement in the Franco-German project. This opposition was clearly established 
within British political elites and parties, and has also taken its place in particular 
executive bodies.  
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate euroscepticism in British governments since 
the 1970s, to define the eurosceptic arguments in terms of theory and to examine the 
results of the movement. According to different authors, such as Anthony Forster, John. 
W. Young or Chris Gifford, the eurosceptic movement has strongly occupied British 
political debates in each of the last five decades, in one form or another. The chapter 
begins in the 1970s, because it was during this time that Britain became a member of the 
EC, and the first huge debate about opposition towards the EC, later the EU, was held in 
a referendum in 1975.  
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Moreover, the country had tried to join the Community since the first half of the 1960s 
and finally finished negotiations over membership in 19726, when Edward Heath signed 
the accession treaty in Brussels and the treaty was followed by parliamentary ratification 
in July that year (Forster 2002: 33). This decision was made because of the British 
economic recession, problems with industrial modernization and the deterioration of 
relations with the USA. However, the government policy of building a coalition with 
Europe was opposed by political mobilisation against Europe in defence of the 
superiority of British institutions (Gifford 2008: 15). This movement still remains in the 
contemporary coalition government, however the source of it and its nature have 
changed.  
Therefore, this thesis outlines the six periods of euroscepticism namely 1970 – 1975, a 
period of activity among Anti-Marketeers and the Heath-Wilson strategy towards 
Europe; 1975 – 1989, a period of inactivity among the sceptics and Thatcher’s approach; 
1989 – 1997, the effective activities developed by the eurosceptic movement at the 
executive level; 1997 – 2003, Labour’s welcoming strategy towards the EU; 2003 – 
2009, the crisis and disillusionment with the EU; 2009 – nowadays, the pinnacle of 
contemporary euroscepticism. The thesis now starts with an analysis of euroscepticism in 
particular executive bodies.  
 
3.1. 1970s – the period of entrance to the Community and the period of 
British discontent 
Britain first applied to join the EC in 1961, when Macmillan’s Conservative government 
decided to secure fundamental geopolitical objectives in the face of imperial decline. It 
was a step towards a kind of nation-state building amid the disintegration of the British 
Empire. Previous governments had tried to reestablish a strong alliance with 
Commonwealth countries and to restore Britain's imperial influence. However, this 
strategy was wrong and Britain went into deep economic crisis, while the six countries of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 However, officially Britain became a full member of the EC since 1st January 1973 along with Ireland and 
Denmark (Forster 2002: 33). 
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the EC were doing well. The key event, which led directly to the application to the EC, 
was the 1956 Suez crisis7  (Gifford 2008: 38).  
The United States saw British membership in the EC as a vital source of Western Unity. 
President Kennedy was sure that outside of Europe, Britain would be “a force for 
division rather than cohesion since she is a giant lodestar drawing with unequal degrees 
of force on each member state” (Evans in Gifford 2008: 42). Britain was forced to apply 
to the community, since it had had to consolidate its special relationship with the USA, 
which wanted Britain to be a member for security and economic reasons (Gifford 2008: 
42). The membership was no longer seen as a threat by the government, even in the 
economic sphere; indeed it was believed that entry into the EC would reinvigorate the 
British economy and end its excessive support of the Commonwealth (Gowland and 
Turner 2000: 121).  
By the early 1970s, the European integration process had become an instrument of crisis 
management, which Britain had actively used according to the situation in the country. 
The decline of the British economy was due to the lack of modernisation and also 
emerged in the context of the crisis in American hegemony and the global economic 
downturn. Membership of the EC was seen only as a source of better industrial 
competitiveness and of foreign investments. However, the problem of political 
integration was not opened at this time, which later led, in the 1990s, to political elites 
being convinced to re-debate membership terms (Gifford 2008: 52). 
After de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969 and the return of the Conservative Party under 
Heath’s leadership into power in 1970, membership seemed a very real possibility. 
Edward Heath outlined his British-European vision – to secure Britain’s place as a 
leading European capitalist-nation state. Britain’s membership appeared to be a 
mandatory goal to be achieved at almost any price, which is why some eurosceptics 
argue that Heath's government failed to institutionalise a coherent British European 
project (Gifford 2008: 54–55).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Suez Crisis is connected with British invasion to Egypt in a reaction to Nasser’s nationalization of Suez canal. 
The grounds for this action were that Nasser wanted to block oil reaching Europe and wanted to invade Israel. 
However, the attack on Egypt failed and this led to an immediate sterling crisis in Britain, and American 
government committed the support for economic stabilization, only if Britain removed her troops. The Suez Crisis 
split Conservative government and party in general (Turner 2000: 50 – 51). 
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Heathite strategy about Europe was based on two opportunities. The first applied to the 
British foreign policy, in which European integration appeared to be at the centre whilst 
the second was a pragmatic one, related to the European contribution to economic 
renewal. He believed that the exposure of the British economy to European competition 
would keep down inflation, producing an influx of foreign capital, which would help to 
reduce the balance deficits and to finance new investments (Lord 1993: 23, 39). 
The negotiations on British membership lasted for eighteen months and concerned the 
position of sterling as an international reserve currency, Commonwealth trade, 
agriculture and the British budgetary contribution. Britain accepted the Common 
Agricultural Policy and negotiated special arrangements for Commonwealth trade. The 
position of sterling was not discussed during official negotiations of entry and thus the 
issue remained open. However, the British were forced to make concessions on their 
budgetary contribution (Gifford 2008: 56).  
Britain finally gained membership in 1972 after Edward Heath signed the accession 
treaty and after following parliamentary ratification of the Act. During the negotiations, 
the government briefly flirted with the idea of a referendum, but Heath took the view that 
Parliament was most likely to deliver a supportive vote in the form of the European 
Communities Act (Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 11). 
At this point a key question must be addressed: who were the eurosceptics and what 
arguments did they have? The eurosceptic movement in the 1970s was almost entirely 
represented by anti-Marketeers, who flirted with issues relating to commerce and trading. 
This group promoted the Commonwealth as the alternative to the EC, because it was 
believed that food prices would rise and that initially there would be a negative impact on 
the British balance of payment. Anti-Marketeers also used arguments against European 
bureaucracy in favour of their policy and one such group actively tried to contain British 
pro-European policy and to undermine the government position, creating a “shadow” 
Cabinet (Forster 2002: 39). Their cause operated with a utilitarian dimension that was 
evident even from their first designation connected with the market. Their arguments 
were based on the concept of democratic deficit, which was not as developed during this 
period. It should be also noted that pro-European forces acknowledged eurosceptic 
arguments and tried to create their own counterarguments, based on economic prosperity 
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and principles of “good governance”. However, the entry to the Community left many 
unresolved issues, especially the issue of the entry’s legitimacy.  
 
 
 
3.1.1. ‘No’ vs. ‘Yes’ Vote referendum – Harold Wilson and 
Labour’s attitude 
Harold Wilson returned to the Prime Minister’s post in February 1974 and gave an 
opportunity for anti-Marketeers to raise the question of the entry’s legitimacy. The 
opposition had two main trump cards. The first was the fact that, in 1972, Wilson 
committed himself to a re-negotiation of the terms of the entry to the EC8 (Forster 2002: 
48). The second trump card was Wilson’s commitment to a consultative referendum on 
membership. Anti-Marketeers used these points to open their No vote campaign to resist 
membership of the EC and to undermine the PM’s attempt to support the organization 
fellowship. Wilson appointed himself as a pro-European politician and refused to join the 
anti-membership campaign, regardless of the decision of his party (King 1977: 53, 58). 
The Prime Minister tried to form his government on the basis of renegotiating 
membership terms. Wilson took steps to ensure that his Cabinet did not consist of anti-
Marketeers and made sure that its members were roughly split into three groups: those 
who supported membership; those who opposed it; those who were uncommitted, but 
loyal to the PM (King 1977: 81). It should be also noted that Wilson and his Foreign 
Secretary, who would later become the Prime Minister of Great Britain, James 
Callaghan, were the only ones involved in the renegotiation of membership terms; the 
Cabinet was excluded from these discussions. This practice worked well which is why, 
when the issue was put to the vote, they voted in favour (Forster 2002: 57). 
The opposition group was made up of different political parties and groups. The National 
Referendum Campaign, the leaders of which were Neil Marten, Douglas Jay, Christopher 
Smith and Richard Body, represented the ‘No Vote' campaign. Its basic aims were to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  This renegotiation included seven areas: “a zero VAT rating on basic items; protection of Britain’s balance of 
payments by limiting capital movements with the EC; criticism of Economic and Monetary Union; reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy; assistance to Commonwealth exporters; freedom of manoeuvre for Britain’s regional 
and industrial policies; reduction of British budgetary contribution“ (Forster 2002: 49).	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restore to Parliament the exclusive right to pass laws and raise taxes, to renew the 
freedom of trade between Britain and the rest of the world, and to function as a 
coordinating body for member groups. However, in some aspects this group looked more 
like an anti-political body, because of the inclusion in its ranks of the Get Britain Out 
group, which preferred an anti-establishment tone for their campaign. Loyal MPs 
opposed this idea, which is why the NRC had no single message and no common 
motivation (Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 98–99, 110). This group used popular arguments 
connected with material aspects9, which they believed had not materialized. Prices were 
already high at the time and thus it seemed that their arguments were valid. However, it 
was more of a speculation than a real danger, partially due to the fact that the 1970s was 
a time of deep economic crisis in the whole world (Forster 2002: 54). The NRC 
Campaign worked very badly in that they had no clear alternative to offer and fell back 
on the argument that the EC was less important than other cooperative organizations 
(Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 183).  
The next set of arguments, put forward by the NRC, focused on the nature of integration 
and its impact on Britain. As Anthony Forster argues, these arguments were really 
important for Labour anti-Marketeers and created a partisan critique of the EC. This 
process later influenced the shape and direction of the Labour Party, especially in terms 
of its socialist agenda which became an important part of the party’s programme. These 
arguments also included the sovereignty question, which was mostly discussed by the 
Conservative, Enoch Powell. It was once stated that the EC would mean an end to the 
long and famous history of the British nation. Membership was seen as the final act of a 
self-governing nation and a democratically elected Parliament as a supreme-law body 
(Forster 2002: 56, 63). According to the thesis’ dimensions of operationalization, anti-
Marketeers used all three dimensions, however their arguments were weak and 
sometimes seemed unbelievable for general public. Populist approaches, which were the 
part of NRC campaign, did not attract wider groups of society and influenced only 
political elites inside the political system. 
However, pro-European forces with the Prime Minister’s support had a few advantages 
over their rivals. The first lay in the fact that it was the Prime Minister who decided about 
the wording of the questions and the time of the possible referendum and could also unite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This kind of arguments belongs to the utilitarian dimension of operationalization of euroscepticism. 
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governmental and party resources in support of any decision which the Cabinet took. The 
second, but equally important, advantage was the role of money in the campaign. The 
‘Yes’ Vote campaign gained nearly one and half billion pounds, the largest sum ever 
accumulated for an electoral campaign. Meanwhile, the No Vote campaign was run on 
only 250 000 pounds (Forster 2002: 59).  
The ‘Yes’ campaign included different figures from business, politics, the media and 
even from the church. It placed emphasis on economic prosperity, which Britain could 
gain from membership in the EC, and also paid attention to the effects of a possible 
withdrawal. The Pro-European group saw their position as pragmatic and underlined the 
control of national governments over European decision-making. They saw membership 
as fruitful and believed that “there was no engagement with the project of European 
integration as representing a fundamental transformation of the British state” (Gifford 
2008: 62). 
Shortly thereafter, it was agreed that a membership referendum would be held in June 
1975. The timing of the referendum played a big role in results, because Wilson tried to 
hold it as quickly as possible once he realised the amount of supporters who would come 
out in favour of membership. In fact, he did just that in April 1975, when he saw that the 
number of voters opposing membership was twice as low (Forster 2002: 59).  
The result was predictable, nearly 2 in every 3 respondents voted for continued 
membership. A post referendum analysis suggested that “voters followed their parties’ 
lead with the most divided voters being Labour supporters, of whom over half had 
endorsed continued membership” (Forster 2002: 60). The result influenced the image of 
sceptics and showed their weaknesses. Anti-Marketeers lost confidence among the 
British public and politicians. However, this group became responsible for a rise in the 
eurosceptic movement and established populist approaches towards European integration 
across political parties and cultures, and even influencing certain executive bodies.  
With the small exception of the 1979 European Parliament general elections and the 
budget reduction in 1984, the European issue did not figure prominently among the 
general public and was not widely criticized in the political sphere, especially at the 
executive level (Forster 2002: 50). Significant changes were to come after Margaret 
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Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1989 and eurosceptics were forced to broaden their agenda 
in order to influence the executive political stance. 
In conclusion, it should be stated that while euroscepticism grew in the 1970s, support 
from among the general public was low. Furthermore, euroscepticism was divided among 
different political groups and significant politicians and thus the movement lacked unity. 
In order to be successful, the movement needed to gain additional financial support and 
an appropriate academic background. 
 
3.2. The transformation of M. Thatcher 
The governing Conservative Party, with a strong and innovative leader in Margaret 
Thatcher, defined the 1980s in Britain. Her political ideas were based on “… a clear 
ideological, economic and political break with the Keynesian-Beveridge settlement that 
had placed the extension of the welfare state, full employment and state intervention at 
the centre of British politics” (Gifford 2008: 84). It was a new and creative policy which 
was developed to change the economic instability and to reanimate British growth and 
power. It was also a reaction against the Fordism initiatives that had failed to resolve the 
post-imperial crisis (Gifford 2008: 84, 86). 
The tenure of M. Thatcher in connection with the EC and its policies can be divided into 
two periods. The first period was the period of European policy engagement, the most 
notable point of which was the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in February 
1986 and the Fontainebleau rebate for the UK on its contribution to the EU budget in 
1984.  
During discussions about creating of the single currency and strong political union, Prime 
Minister Thatcher changed her opinion and moved to a sceptical position towards the 
European Community. She introduced her eurosceptical arguments in the Bruges speech 
on 20 September 1988 (Forster 2002: 63–64). Next subchapter pays a close attention to 
this speech, analyses the main points and describes its results. 
 
3.2.1. Thatcher’s first government 
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Margaret Thatcher first came to office in 1979 and inherited the British state in a deep 
economic crisis. She created a strong leadership and depicted herself in public as a 
person who took a tough stance on European affairs. As Prime Minister she pursued a 
European policy of engagement, which took power away from backbenchers10 and 
developed a majority in the parliamentary arena (Forster 2002: 63). 
The position of the first Thatcher administration towards the EC was therefore closer to 
that of the previous Labour government than that of the Heath era. The Conservatives 
believed that the EC did not play a fundamental role in its policy proposals for a British 
recovery. Europe was to be imagined as a flexible international arena for the pursuit of 
national interest. A key feature of Thatcher’s approach was to resist the constraints 
imposed by the EC and to begin to create a distinctive approach to the Community and 
cooperation in general, e.g. the budget dispute and the Westland affair (Gifford 2008: 
90). 
Her policy was based on the principle of public scepticism, but, behind close doors, the 
Prime Minister made a series of compromises and concessions to secure key objectives. 
According to Conservative minister of Foreign Affairs Douglas Hurd, “Thatcher thus 
used the vocabulary of skeptics but ultimately acquiesced in, and at times added 
momentum to, further European integration. It was Thatcher’s approach to Europe and 
the old-Marketeers’ own lack of personal standing within the party which effectively 
prevented any serious resistance to a series of policies which took Britain more deeply 
into an ‘ever closing union’ during this period” (Forster 2002: 63). 
The first milestone in Thatcherite European policy was the issue of the budget dispute, 
which started with initial renegotiations by Wilson but did not produce any tangible 
financial results. By 1979 the transitional period of Britain into the EC came to an end, so 
Britain would have to pay all contributions. Thatcher understood that the amount of 
payment was disproportionate to the UK economy and reopened the issue in December 
1979 during the Dublin Conference. During that time she announced her famous 
intention “to get our money back”. However, the question had been resolved during the 
Fontainebleau meeting in 1984 when Britain received a refund on its contributions and an 
annual rebate (Forster 2002: 91). The main reason for the rebate was that a high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Backbencher is a Member of Parliament in the Westminster system, who does not hold governmental office. He 
serves in relative anonymity and votes when and how their leader tells them to (Malcolmson and Myers 2012: 126). 
	   23	  
proportion of the EC budget (at that time 80%, now approximately 41%) is spent on 
the CAP, which benefits the UK much less than other countries as it has a relatively 
small farming sector as a proportion of its GDP. The second reason lay in the fact that, at 
the time, the UK was the second poorest member of the ten European Economic 
Community members (Cooper 2012: 1194– 1195).	  
Significantly, this issue also showed an underlying scepticism about the European 
project. Skidelsky goes even further and argues that Thatcher questioned not only the 
economic issue, but the very legitimacy of the Community, because she believed that the 
main function of the budget was ‘purely’ political – to provide an income for a European 
state (Skidelsky 1993: 358). According to the operationalization of euroscepticism it 
could be said that the question of a rebate had some roots in the economic dimension of 
this term. Discussions revolved around a high budget and real scepticism about its 
formation testified to the existence of soft Euroscepticism even in the early stages of M. 
Thatcher's tenure.  
Insofar as Thatcher was pro-European, she saw the EC as an organization, which could 
promote economic liberalism in the industrial and service sectors. Therefore the second 
milestone in Thatcher’s European policy was the parliamentary ratification of the Single 
European Act.11 This policy was far removed from scepticism and introduced the 
conservative government’s priority – to change the direction of the discussion towards 
the practical achievement of a free internal market and away from institutional reform. 
The British government was to oppose the French position and to stop the expansion of 
the powers of the European parliament. With the focus primarily on economic integration 
and with few concessions to those who had a more federalist agenda, the eventual 
outcome of the negotiations over the SEA was viewed as a British victory (Forster 2002: 
67).  
Britain’s position towards the SEA was strict and very different to the position of other 
members. The country opposed strengthening monetary coordination, political and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The Single European Act was approved by European heads of government in 1986, and has linked liberalization 
of the European market with procedural reform. The first part, called White Paper, aimed to create an area without 
internal frontiers and to include free movement of people, goods, services and capital. The second half of it 
consisted of procedural reforms designed to streamline decision making in the Council of Ministers of the EC from 
qualified majority voting about vital interests to qualified majority voting on matters about the internal market 
(Moravcsik 1991: 19–20).  
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defence cooperation, advocated the facilitation of more majority voting and supported the 
liberalization of the market after the budget issue was resolved. The Thatcher 
government was cautious of attempts to strengthen the European Commission and the 
European Parliament and to expand EC competence in areas not directly connected with 
trade, indirect taxation and social legislation. The Prime Minister felt that a common 
monetary policy would undermine British sovereignty, and when Britain and Germany 
refused to participate in complete liberalization of capital markets, other countries also 
did so. Thus a compromise was made, with no concrete steps beyond its existing policies 
(Moravcsik 1991: 28, 32, 42). 
After the successful ratification of this Treaty it was stated that euroscepticism had 
declined in the British political arena. Margaret Thatcher became a symbol of a possible 
adjustment in the relationship between the EC and Britain. Her role in the reform of the 
Community was ambivalent, but worked well.  
However, the situation quickly changed. Further discussions about the future of the EC 
had been worrying the conservative government for some time and Thatcher brought up 
these worries in Bruges in 1989.  
 
3.2.2. Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech – the active phase of 
scepticism 
The Bruges speech was given by Margaret Thatcher at the College of Europe in 
September 1988. This speech started a new phase of Conservative attitude towards the 
EC, characterised by the move from an instrumental and pragmatic position on European 
integration to an ideological one. She moved from an incidental position of membership 
to perceiving it as a threat. During this period the first key steps were taken in the 
movement of the opponents of European integration from an anti-market position to a 
Eurosceptical one. Before the Bruges speech, opponents of integration focused their 
attention on an anti-market position. Afterwards, however, the critics' position 
transformed into criticism of the Political and Economic Union. It was the dawning of a 
new era of Euroscepticism (Forster 2002: 63–65). 
In Bruges, Margaret Thatcher argued that “willing and active cooperation between 
independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European 
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Community”.12 She saw this process as dependent on governments and their judgment as 
to the value of current and future agreements. This point of view was not anti-European, 
but saw the process as dependent on the individual assessment by each government 
involved in the process (Forster 2002: 76). 
However, this speech presented three main critical points toward the European 
Community. The first point discussed the structure of the EC which had opened 
negotiations about closer integration. Thatcher saw the single voice of the Community as 
suppressing nationalism and concentrating power in one centre. She claimed that this was 
a highly damaging phenomenon, which would destroy all previously achieved goals. She 
believed that cooperation should exist, but should be dispersed among nation states in 
order to gain success. The next structural problem for the British Conservatives was the 
possible creation of a Political Union and EMU.  Thatcher told the public that there was 
no need to create new regulations, which would raise the cost of employment and make 
Europe’s labour market less flexible and less competitive with foreign suppliers.13 
This critical point can be connected with the sovereignty dimension of operationalization. 
Thatcher openly labelled increasing EC competencies, such as the creation of a strong 
Political Union and the EMU, as a loss of sovereignty. She believed that close political 
integration was unnecessary and, in some ways, dangerous. Also, this criticism can be 
connected to the utilitarian dimension, because of the possibility of a forfeit in the labour 
market, of growing unemployment and of a decline in manufacturing. Even though 
economic cooperation was perceived as a good thing, its foundation had to be built upon 
other, reformed principles, which are discussed below.  
The second critical point was based on the current policy problems, faced by the 
Community. The former Prime Minister stated that “ [i]f we cannot reform those 
Community policies which are patently wrong or ineffective and which are rightly 
causing public disquiet, than we shall not get the public support for the Community’s 
future development”.14  She believed that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)15 was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Thatcher, Margaret (1988). The Bruges Speech. The Telegraph [online]. September 1988. [cit. 18. 3. 2014]. 
Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3562258/Full-text-of-Margaret-Thatchers-
speech-to-the-College-of-Europe-The-Bruges-Speech.html. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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far from complete, because of over-production and limited costs. The challenge facing 
the Community was to show political courage and create a stable and effective farming 
industry. Also, Thatcher emphasized the need to avoid protectionism and to encourage 
enterprise (Forster 2002: 77). 
The third critical feature of the speech was what the EC might become. Thatcher did not 
accept the vision of Europe as a federation like the United States. The most fundamental 
and critical issue related to this vision was the creation of a Western European Union as 
an alternative to NATO. According to Thatcher’s opinion, the WEU “… should be 
developed… as a means of strengthening Europe’s contribution to the common defense of 
the West”.16 
The growing consolidation surrounding Thatcher’s agenda marked a shift away from the 
domination of the anti-market Labour left to a rightist Eurosceptical movement. This 
movement attracted academic sphere, which began to debate and to create analytical 
framework. This led to a broader support network outside Parliament, sparked an 
intellectual debate and created an environment in which to advance the Eurosceptical 
cause on a multidimensional front (Forster 2002: 72; Baker and Seawright 1998: 193–
195). 
To summarise, the Bruges speech united different groups of sceptics and established an 
intellectual agenda for opposing European integration. Thatcher became a symbol of the 
new movement, which is still influential in the British domestic arena. By applying 
Taggart’s and Szczerbiak’s definition, it could be said that the Conservative Party and her 
leader supported the soft version of Euroscepticism in British policy at the end of the 
decade and discussed the issue of further integration more seriously in the 1990s.  
The end of the 1980s can be marked as a period of slow growth of euroscepticism, 
although the beginning of the decade was very much in the spirit of  “hidden” support for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Common Agricultural Policy – one of the oldest policies of the European Union, is strongly rooted in the 
European integration project. The CAP aimed at encouraging better productivity in the food chain, ensuring fair 
standard of living to the agricultural community, market stabilization and ensuring the availability of food supplies 
to EU consumers at reasonable price. It has been developing through all the history of EC/EU (European 
Commission 2014). 
16 Thatcher, Margaret (1988). The Bruges Speech. The Telegraph [online]. September 1988. [cit. 18. 3. 2014]. 
Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3562258/Full-text-of-Margaret-Thatchers-
speech-to-the-College-of-Europe-The-Bruges-Speech.html. 
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European integration. Thus, a strong belief in better economic cooperation existed and 
political elites saw the industrial recovery as being strongly based on this process.  
 
3.3. John Major’s government – debates before Maastricht Treaty 
John Major was elected in 1990 as the leader of the Conservative party and the man to 
resolve the crisis created by Thatcherism. This crisis was “evidenced by an economic 
recession, growing electoral unpopularity for the Conservatives and the unease within a 
party over European integration” (Gifford 2008: 111). A key feature of his 
administration was a commitment to protect and improve public service provision and 
this accounted for increases in public taxes. Some of his ministers, for example Patten 
and Willets, tried to present the modern conservative attitude as a combination of 
Thatcher’s free trade radicalism and a belief in community, which was rooted in the long 
tradition of conservative state building (ibid: 111). 
His main political slogan appealing to European integration was based on the idea of 
placing Britain at the “heart of Europe”. A key feature of this approach was to rebuild 
relations and secure alliances with the European governing elite and governments, which 
had been alienated by Mrs. Thatcher.  His advisors and Foreign Secretary actively used 
the strategy that was built on the idea to place British Conservatives in the mainstream of 
European politics (Forster 1998: 352, 357). They made close contacts with German 
political parties, such as the Christian Democrats, and also with parties in the European 
parliament. Major believed that close cooperation with Germany would stop French 
attempts to create a monetary union. Major's economic strategy was based on continued 
membership of the ERM, the goal of which was to attempt to revise the Thatcher 
settlement (Smith 1992: 155). 
Moreover, J. Major routinely met with sceptical MPs to briefly inform them on 
developments and the major stumbling blocks, and to outline the government’s position 
on the key issues. He frequently reassured them personally that he would not sign the 
treaty, which would undermine national sovereignty. Furthermore, the Prime Minister 
tried to win over the most critical politicians with the promise of posts in his government. 
Shortly after his personal approach and his policy designed to achieve the compromise 
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failed, he gave the government seats to some Eurosceptics and bound them by the 
associated responsibility (Forster 2002: 97). 
However, the ideological dominance of Thatcherism left little room for a creative 
political agenda. Gifford argues that this increasingly crystallized once “the Major 
government became preoccupied with party unity and abandoned attempts to construct 
an intellectual coherent project along the lines Patten and others had envisaged” 
(Gifford: 112). As mentioned earlier, opposition against the government's European 
policy strengthened and created a complex network of arguments and players, which 
effectively put Major’s position under increasing pressure and proved to be a disaster that 
created a divide among the Conservatives, ultimately destroying the credibility of the 
government. 
The application of the Maastricht Treaty had one more important purpose for the 
Community – creating a political union, which would unite member states and create 
common foreign and security policy. However, for British Eurosceptics this meant the 
loss of sovereignty and national identity. As Mrs. Thatcher said in her speech: “We do 
not want the United States of Europe”. 17  It was a common opinion among both 
Conservative and Labour politicians. 
The main focus of the political opposition was the situation, in which the range and 
power ceded to a central authority. The scrapping of national currencies led to the 
creation of the European Union in political terms, with common security and foreign 
policies, the possibility of defense capability and justice and home affairs responsibilities, 
whereas the traditional British agenda was only based on the implementation of the 
Common Market. Sceptics, who argued that the lesson from the SEA was not learned, 
strongly blamed Major’s government. They saw expansive Treaty language as a weapon 
for European federalists. Also, the Eurosceptics critique was focused on the 
government’s lack of attention to detail. The attack regarded the fact that the British opt-
outs were not as easy as the government had suggested (Forster 2002: 93–94). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Thatcher, Margaret (1988). The Bruges Speech. The Telegraph [online]. September 1988. [cit. 18. 3. 2014]. 
Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3562258/Full-text-of-Margaret-Thatchers-
speech-to-the-College-of-Europe-The-Bruges-Speech.html. 
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One more factor, which British Eurosceptics of the Political Union wanted to reduce, was 
the social policy in Europe. Thatcher began this argument in her speech and gave an 
explanation of the effects of its implementation, namely that it was an attack on the 
principles of free trade.18 This argument was used once more by Cash, who argued that 
the original free market agenda was replaced by the will of political integration; “they 
want … to create one country” (Gifford 2008: 133). 
Those arguments belong to the sovereignty dimension of operationalization and describe 
the opposition against a political union during the duration of John Major’s government. 
MPs and some cabinet ministers, who supported Thatcher, saw the Maastricht Treaty as a 
weapon against state sovereignty and tried to go against the grain, but their hard line was 
rejected. 
The debate surrounding the EMU forced Major’s members of the Cabinet to resist 
negative goals and objectives such as the acceptance of the single currency, common 
foreign and security policy and common social policy. Despite Patten and his assistants 
wanting Britain to be a part of an extensive European Policy, British politics prevented 
the country from going in that direction (Gifford 2008: 117). Major’s government 
underestimated the role of the ERM in the state economy and opted out. These opt outs 
enabled the Prime Minister to avoid the political ramifications of the EMU and the Social 
Chapter without having to veto the whole Maastricht Treaty (Forster 1998: 361–363).  
Such skepticism can be associated both with the utilitarian dimension and the question of 
the democratic deficit of operationalization, because the single currency and common 
policies, connected with defence and foreign affairs, undermine the external trade of the 
country and give the power to make decisions to the intergovernmental bodies, which are 
seen as a source of democratic deficit. Among the most popular economic arguments was 
a belief that the EC/EU had not delivered the economic benefits, which were claimed, 
and that single currency would not profit as well. However, between political arguments 
can be named new predictions that EMU would lead to the creation of Political Union, in 
which would not exist independent policies of welfare improvement, employment and 
wealth creation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Thatcher, Margaret (1988). The Bruges Speech. The Telegraph [online]. September 1988. [cit. 18. 3. 2014]. 
Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3562258/Full-text-of-Margaret-Thatchers-
speech-to-the-College-of-Europe-The-Bruges-Speech.html. 
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Major’s position on Europe was ambiguous because his main objective was to unite the 
party and represent both the right and the left. He reflected the policy at the heart of 
Europe, sometimes compromising it with a Eurosceptical position. The adoption of an 
obstructivist, neo-Thatcherite approach to the EC, later to become the EU, left the 
government marginalized and damaged. After the withdrawal from the ERM, John Major 
adopted a new position, which claimed that the steps being taken by the French were 
wrong and that Europe was exactly what Thatcher said it was in her Bruges speech – 
different nation states united by active cooperation and a free trade base (Gifford 2008: 
135). 
At the beginning of the 1990s the trend of euroscepticism’s growth was seen in many 
spheres, especially in the sphere of political elites. To sum up, John Major was trying to 
create his own policy which welcomed European policy, but the fragmentation of the 
party and strong voice of eurosceptics, who included supporters of Thatcher and other 
units, undermined his government and made his policy ineffective. The side effect of this 
was a feeling of unease and worry among the general public and a huge amount of 
sceptical articles were published in popular newspapers. 
 
3.4. Labour government: Anglo-Europe and Euroscepticism 
In 1997 the Conservative party comprehensively lost the election and ceded control of 
the UK political arena to the Labour Party. Its leader Tony Blair came to power with a 
programme committed not only to fundamental constitutional change in the UK but also 
to the institutions of transnational governance. The Labour Party spelled out its policy as 
a co-operative pro-European policy, which placed “social Europe” at the centre of a 
modernised platform (Gifford 2008: 139). Blair's leadership, along with that of his 
successor Gordon Brown, emphasised “the promotion of labour market flexibility and 
economic reform in order to ensure the competitiveness of the European economy in an 
era of globalisation” (Fella 2006: 388). Through this policy they wanted to promote 
strong European political structures, which would ensure that corporations and 
transnational companies could not cause damage to the common man. They sought to 
prevent Europe and its small entrepreneurs from becoming global commercial forces 
(ibid: 392). 
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The major domestic task regarding the EU was to put Britain back into the center of the 
European debate. However, foreign policy had not played a big role in the Labour 
campaign and its key idea was that “[i]t shall be a government, too, that gives this 
country strength and confidence in leadership both at home and abroad, particularly in 
respect of Europe”.19 
Both Blair and Brown tried to change public attitude towards the European Union. They 
decided to use the discourse method and challenged British “otherness”, which was based 
on a number of factors, such as history and geography, wars, and its electoral and 
parliamentary system etc. Both Prime Ministers were well aware of the national story 
they were attempting to rewrite (Daddow 2011: 133 –134). 
However, Blair’s and later Brown’s policy did not succeed in changing general British 
attitudes towards the EU. The general public, academics and politicians in all parties 
(even in Labour) remained sceptical about some of the implementations of the new 
European Union’s agreements. It replaced British exceptionalism in terms of political 
economy and political identity and actively pursued an Anglo-European project that 
attempted to move the direction of the European Union in a British direction rather than 
vice versa (Gifford 2008: 139). 
The first subchapter describes the Labour party’s attempt to reassert the policy of 
Europeanism in its government, as well as giving explanations about how they decided to 
approach the achievement of this goal and what the results were. In the second part of 
this chapter, readers can find criticisms of both Blair and Brown’s governments and also 
a description of their key mistakes in European strategy. 
 
3.4.1. Labour’s attempt to reassert Anglo-Europeanism 
The Labour Party, after taking office in 1997, challenged the British way of thinking 
about Europe. Thatcher and later Brown created a strong division of European sceptics in 
political arena, public and academic spectrum. The Blair government attempted to 
undermine Franco-German dominance and construct an Anglo-conservative leadership 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Blair, Tony (1997). Blair's speech at 10 Downing Street. CNN. 2.05.1997 [cit. 03.04.2014]. Available from 
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9705/02/blair.speech/. 
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based on security and economic de-regulation. Such economic strategy was built on 
widespread public ownership and heavy state intervention, in which EU membership 
would no longer be an obstacle to the implementation of party policy (Gifford 2008: 139-
140). This was visible from New Labour's attempts to create coalitions with right wing 
governments and conservative leaders such as Berlusconi and Aznar. In addition, the 
strategy of building coalitions both in the East and West with a principled opposition to 
deeper integration was warmly welcomed (Fella 2006: 391). Blair thought that the 
European Union should concentrate on questions such as economic policy, immigration 
and environment, rather than creating strong governmental bodies. Curiously, by taking 
this position, he was actually very close to Major’s attempt to see Britain in Europe on 
economic matters, but not as a threat to national sovereignty (Daddow 2011: 1). For 
example, the Labour government resisted making the European Chapter of Fundamental 
Rights legally binding for the UK much to the frustration of the British trade union 
movement as British workers would then be excluded from its social and employment 
rights (Fella 2006: 395). 
One of Blair’s immediate concerns before he took office, as regards EU policy, was the 
immediacy of a further IGC to review the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. His 
advisors and party politicians created a programme, which was called The Future of the 
European Union, and agreed that there was a need to bolster the EU’s social democratic 
content, to significantly extend the European Parliament, and to support strong social 
dimension and economic coordination in order to create employment and a European 
Recovery Fund for better distribution of the wealth created by a single market. However, 
after Blair came to power, this strategy changed. The emphasis of Labour’s EU policy 
switched from promoting employment rights to avoiding costs to businesses and 
maximizing the flexibility of the labour market (Fella 2006: 392–393). 
The New Labour government created a strategy, which they thought would well work 
even with the level of Euroscepticism in Britain. In language terms, they tried to achieve 
a theory of ‘norm entrepreneurship’. Wodak and a collection of other authors describes 
this theory as discourse, which would change “social actors constitute knowledge, 
situations, social role as well as identities and interpersonal relations between various 
interacting social groups and those who interact with them” (De Cillia, Reisigl and 
Wodak 1999: 157). Blair and Brown were well aware, or were made well aware by their 
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advisors, of this discourse and used it as a weapon against the sceptics. They identified 
that British people were being kept in a permanent state of discursive war with the 
continent, in which the Eurosceptical position limited people’s thoughts and actions 
towards Europe (Daddow 2001: 65). The first step was “to reframe Britain’s debates 
about Europe and the EU through a systematic revisioning of the language, imagery and 
points of historical references around which Britain’s Europe debates occurred in the 
political, public and media worlds” (ibid: 67). Also it was necessary to create an 
organizational platform on which to build a consensus about new norms. Blair and 
Brown used existing NGOs, and made speeches at universities, business organizations, 
think tanks and institutions of the EU to spread their messages. However, Labour 
politicians did not deliver upon their strategy of discourse. This defeat was determined by 
influential political leaders such as M. Thatcher, who did not give up and continued to 
fight against active European policies, but also by critical media, which delivered their 
Eurosceptical message to a huge number of readers (ibid: 67). 
In looking at the arguments, which were used to deliver new points of view towards the 
EU at the end of the 1990s and before 9/11, economical and influential benefits and 
security framework were at the forefront. The economic benefits were named as a main 
resource of New Labour policy as regards the transformation of Britain into a Euro-
friendly country. Both former Prime Ministers thought that through prioritized economic 
possibilities arising from British industrial openness to the European technological 
cooperation, the country would grow economically more quickly and would become 
dominant among EU countries. The government supported the EU's employment rate, 
which was created by the single market and cost 3.5 million jobs. In his speech to the 
business community, Brown also used the history of growing interconnectedness with the 
continent as an indicator of positive European influence over Britain. However, the ‘five 
tests’ of G. Brown, which will be described in the next subchapter, and the disagreement 
between Blair and Brown on the question of the single currency would not deliver the 
predicted transformation of public opinion (Daddow 2011: 91–95). 
Labour’s discourse on the question of British influence in Europe had three main points. 
The first is that Britain would be affected by developments in Europe whether the state is 
in or out of the EU. Secondly, they believed that it would make it easier for Britain to 
reform the EU from the centre of the community rather than from the periphery. Finally, 
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Blair thought that Britain would be in a much stronger position to take its global 
leadership role from an EU platform, than if they stayed outside such a potentially 
powerful block (Daddow 2011: 97; Williams 2009: 233–235). 
The question about the European security framework was fundamental for British New 
Labour until 9/11. Blair represented the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
later to develop into the EC and then the EU, as a clear way forward for countries with a 
totalitarian and central planning past, a promoter of democracy and a servant of good 
values in the wider world. He declared that this structure prevented wars between old 
rivals and created an atmosphere of peace and prosperity. However, after 9/11, the 
Labour Party changed its stance and the free movement of people and goods and services 
was seen as a potential threat to national security, because of the EU's inability to act 
quickly and effectively (Daddow 2011: 103–106). 
The Labour Party was well informed about the Eurosceptic movement and actively used 
descriptions about rivals of the EU to their own advantage. Blair in his speeches 
portrayed the sceptics as ideological opponents to the principle of supranational 
integration. He saw their objective as an intellectually sound, but outdated, rejection of 
shared sovereignty and commonly accepted rules such as majority voting. The most 
sceptical of them, he suggested, wanted to withdraw from the EU itself.20  
It should be noted, that Labour discourse appealed to the main dimensions of 
operationalization. At first, Blair tried to attack the utilitarian dimension and to describe 
the EU as an organization, which would help Britain to recover from industrial, social 
and economic crises. The Labour Prime Ministers (Blair and Brown) also adapted their 
strategy in terms of two other dimensions. They decided to use the globalization process 
as a focal point when attacking the question of democratic deficit and sovereignty 
dimensions, arguing that, in the new world of technology and capital interdependence, it 
is important to create a strong intergovernmental body for effective governance. 
Blair’s cabinet effectively fought with the eurosceptic movement which benefited the 
prime minister’s commitments and discourse. During the first Labour government, the 
attitude of both the public and the elite towards the EU was more neutral than pro-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  Blair, Tony (2006). Speech on Europe. Harvard.edu. [cit. 04. 04. 2014]. Available from 
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic162932.files/Tony_Blair_Oxford_Speech_on_europe.htm. 
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European but in general the trend still existed in the British political arena and influenced 
the British public. A few years later, with the discussions about the Nice Treaty, 
euroscepticism gained real power once again and all the mistakes made by Labour in 
their pro-European policy were shown up. 
 
3.4.2. Labour’s defeat in European policy 
The distinctive Labour approach towards the EU in terms of globalization had an impact 
on business, trade and the life of the people. Blair tried to accept European centrality to 
Britain’s economic interests, but did not want to fully integrate without benefits for his 
own country. However, understanding the driving forces of the UK produces a 
counterargument, which describes the British economy as a mechanism dependent on 
financial and trading activities rather than manufacturing and production. According to 
this, it seems ineffective to take the British financial system deeper into European 
legislative and control apparatus, which would restrict the flow of money and 
relationships with global capital trade (Gifford 2008: 142). 
Why did not this situation change? What were the problems of Labour policy related to 
Europe? First of all, the Labour party picked up the ‘no strategy’ view that Europe was 
mistreated by Blair and Downing Street on the one hand and Brown and the Treasury on 
the other.  For Blair the top priorities were domestic issues, and the question of European 
policy was highly problematic. His personal attitude was focused on personal diplomacy 
with the US, and it was Brown’s responsibility to negotiate with the EU. Secondly, there 
was a failure of leadership on the part of the Prime Minister to hold a referendum on the 
single currency21, which were an attempt to de-politicize the issue through a rule-based 
approach by reducing its electoral salience. The results of the Treasury report showed 
that British businesses and economy in general were prepared to accept the single 
currency, but the problem lay in creating a flexibility between, and sufficient 
convergence with, European economics. Thus, the absence of a referendum from Blair’s 
side, later ended his effective premiership (Daddow 2011: 29). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 These tests included questions about convergence of British economy with EU, flexibility of business and 
workforce, possible investment into country’s economy, results of Eurozone on financial services and employment 
(Sowemimo 1999: 357 – 359). 
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New Labour’s discourses on leadership were representing the shift in the political 
landscape of Britain. However, this landscape did not meld with public attitudes and the 
mixed political messages being delivered highlighted the problem, which combined 
progressive and traditionalist takes on the British role in the world (Daddow 2011: 221). 
As regards the European political arena, there was also a problem in understanding 
British “otherness”. Member states of the EU, especially France, started to challenge the 
British agenda of making special exceptions in order to influence the European budget. 
They wanted to end the British debate, while the British agenda was to change the 
economic structure of the EU, particularly the reshaping of the CAP and the funds 
allocated to it.  Brown went further in his beliefs that economic reform in the EU needed 
to become a precondition for UK membership of the Euro. However, the majority of 
European politicians didn't have such changes in mind and therefore made it impossible 
for the British government to implement activities of this sort (Fella 2006: 389–390). 
The biggest critic of the Labour government’s European policy, Robin Cook, used a 
powerful rhetoric against Blair-Brown’s line on Europe. He suggested that the EU’s 
unpopularity lay in its apparent alignment with the negative impulses of globalization 
such as the erosion of job security and the effect on quality of life. Furthermore, the UK 
government did not help itself by blocking progressive and popular measures that would 
improve the lot of workers in both Britain and the EU. Moreover, Cook opposed the 
tendency of Blair’s government to pass nationalist rhetoric when dealing with the EU in 
order to gain cheap popularity at home. He saw those steps as extremely ineffective and 
argued that this was only “a good press game at home” (ibid: 396–397). 
All of Labour’s critics created a strong counterargument in regard to the economic 
dimension of eurosceptic operationalization. They criticised both Prime Ministers’ 
rhetoric, saying that the meaning of those words showed negative character. Also, the 
huge role the opposition played in the question of democratic deficit, who highlighted the 
disharmony between the European and British political elite, was seen as a major source 
of the problem. 
Eurobarometer, an opinion poll team and journal published annually since 1973, has 
published opinion polls about different countries’ attitude to European affairs. During 
Blair’s period in office, Britain was shown as one of the most sceptical members of the 
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EU and according to both regional polling and analyses, it was a pattern created many 
years ago. Openly critical attitudes towards the EU were more than twice as high in 
Britain compared with the average of the other 27 member states. This showed that, 
despite Blair's best efforts, there was no real improvement in the relations between UK 
and European Union (Daddow 2011: 18–19). 
All of this led to a broad disillusionment with Labour policy, which effectively ended its 
short, but successful popularity and support among the people of Britain. This led to a 
risk of turning the public once again against the European project. The Labour Party left 
a big hole in the question about Europe and thus the trend of euroscepticism became a hot 
topic for the incoming government in terms of future relations.  
 
3.5. Coalitional government - Cameron-Clegg’s strategy toward the 
EU 
The contemporary government was formed in 2010 after the General Election, in which 
the Conservative Party won first place with more than 35%, which was not enough to 
take control of the House of Commons in a majority. The third party with 23% was the 
Liberal Democrats, who agreed to form a coalition government with the Conservatives. 
The hottest question facing the Coalition was to create a united vision regarding the 
European Union. Therefore, to encourage better governance, a leadership discussion 
began and a common manifesto was created, in which both parties tempered their 
enthusiasm and reached common ground to allow them to lead the government (Lynch 
2011: 218, 221). 
The Conservative party, especially its leader David Cameron, gave a pledge to a 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. If Lisbon had not been ratified by all Member 
States when the Conservatives entered office, they would have withdrawn their 
ratification, held a referendum on the treaty and led the campaign for a ‘No’ vote. On the 
subject of ratification, the Conservatives promised to change this policy. It was a promise 
for action in the domestic arena and in the EU to prevent the further strengthening of the 
Union and address concerns about Lisbon (Lynch 2011: 219-220). Their agenda was 
directed to a referendum lock, a full opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 
greater protection against EU invasion into the UK’s criminal justice system. The party 
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believed that the exemptions negotiated by Labour were insufficient, and the repatriation 
of social and employment policy has been a long-standing demand of the Conservatives 
(Charter 2012: 70–71). 
On the other hand, the Liberal Democrats had a different view and agenda towards the 
EU, because they saw themselves as a much more pro-European party. The party 
believed that it was in Britain’s long-term interest to join the single currency, subject to 
approval in a referendum. In the final leadership debate about the economic situation in 
Greece, Clegg denied that the LibDems advocated entry to the Euro. However, they 
committed themselves to a 2005 manifesto related to an “in-out” referendum the next 
time Britain negotiates its relationship with the EU. This stance has changed since the 
Lisbon Treaty, when the party lacked consistency and argued that a referendum is not 
required (Lynch 2011: 220). 
In victory, however, both parties required repatriation pledges during the negotiations 
which would help to create a single policy towards the EU. The Coalition Programme for 
Government developed the right balance between constructive engagement with the EU 
to deal with issues, which are affecting the society and national sovereignty and the 
familiar stance that Britain should play a leading role in an enlarged Union (Charter 
2012: 71). 
The Coalition program rules out participation in a European Public Prosecutor system, 
but other legislation on criminal justice would be based on a case-by-case basis with a 
view to maximizing the country’s security, protecting Britain’s civil liberties and 
preserving the integrity of the criminal justice system. This program in general is not 
different from recent governments, as it still wants to play the role of defender of national 
interest, supporter of the Single Market and further enlargement, and interrogator of the 
reform of CAP and EU budget. It also wants to discuss EU social policy, criminal justice 
and defence proposals (Lynch 2011: 221). 
In looking at the hottest questions about new policy changes, which were brought about 
by the Lisbon Treaty, the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
as a diplomatic service of the EU, should be discussed. The Conservatives had opposed 
the creation of the EEAS but now accepted it as a fact. The contemporary government 
wants to shape the development of this structure, and therefore respects the competence 
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of EU member states in constructing foreign policy and works in cooperation with their 
diplomatic services. However it continues to provide a strong voice in areas where the 
EU has an agreed common position. For example, Cameron’s support for Turkish 
membership in the EU shows the opposition to the common view of other EU members, 
which is against the country’s acceptance (Lynch 2011: 223).  
Now it is quite important to analyze D. Cameron’s speech on membership in the EU, 
which has opened a debate about possibly quitting and started a countrywide agenda for 
withdrawal. In this pronouncement he set out an agenda for EU reform and if those 
reforms do not start, the British government will be supportive of a withdrawal. In his 
speech, the Prime Minister mentioned three current challenges presented by the EU. 
Firstly, there are problems in the Eurozone, which are driving fundamental changes in the 
EU. Countries who currently use the Euro have challenged the crisis of the new currency 
and created a strong policy, which would help to fix it. However, countries outside the 
Eurozone, such as Britain, feel that this policy does not protect their interests and require 
certain safeguards to ensure that their access to funds or the single market is not 
compromised (Cameron 2013: 89, 92). 
Secondly, there is a crisis related to European competitiveness with the rest of the global 
market as its world output is projected to fall by almost a third in the next two decades. 
Complex rules restricting the labour markets, brought about by this prediction, are not 
occurring as a natural phenomenon. Therefore, this presents the huge challenge for 
European leaders to overcome; the creation of a market, which will work for prosperity 
(ibid: 89). 
Finally, there is a “gap between the EU and its citizens, which has grown dramatically in 
recent years. And which represents a lack of democratic accountability and consent that 
is … felt particularly acutely in Britain” (ibid: 89). People are frustrated that decisions 
taken at the EU level are away from everyday concerns such as living standards or taxes. 
This disagreement can be seen during the mass demonstrations and strikes against some 
reforms produced by the EU (ibid: 89). 
However, Cameron said that he personally believes that the EU is a good thing, which 
will be more effective for people after reforms based on five key principles. The first 
principle is competitiveness, which will be based on a single market which must become 
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less bureaucratic, helping its members to compete. The second principle concerns 
flexibility, which would respect the diversity of member countries (Cameron 2013: 89–
90). It should be “a flexible union of free member states who share treaties and 
institutions and pursue together the ideal of co-operation” (ibid 2013: 90). The third 
guideline is that power must be in the hands of each individual national government, and 
thus shared sovereignty is the wrong principle for cooperation. A united structure, he 
claims, cannot unite different countries with different priorities and cultures. The fourth 
principle is democratic accountability, which will allow national parliaments to play a 
more significant role. It will be their priority to look after the interests of their own 
country and do business between themselves. Finally, the fifth principle for reform is 
fairness. The EU should create the kind of policies, which do not punish some of its 
members and therefore do not spread discord (ibid: 90–91). 
Regarding the opposition to the EEAS and the fact that it is one of Cameron’s guiding 
reformatory principles, it should be stated that Conservative rhetoric operates within the 
sovereignty dimension. It was Margaret Thatcher, who first discussed this question, and 
currently it is David Cameron, who is trying to fight against the strengthening of the EU 
in the security and foreign affairs’ spheres. Furthermore, the Prime Minister is using the 
dimension of democratic deficit in his speeches in the hope that national governments 
will eventually have more power over the decision making process in the implementation 
of state interests. The utilitarian dimension has also been used in his speeches and has its 
foundation in his two guiding principles: the abolishment of bureaucratic structures and 
the flexibility of the market, which would profit all members. Analyzing Cameron’s 
guiding principles, the politician can be labelled a eurosceptic. Using Taggart and 
Szczerbiak’s classification his commitments belong to the soft version of euro-
scepticism, because they reject the idea of withdrawal, but offer changes in some policy 
aspects. 
In conclusion, Cameron, by introducing his promise to hold a referendum, energized the 
UKIP and Conservative hard eurosceptics, whilst at the same time challenging cabinet 
proponents, who are pro-European and for whom a commitment to a referendum appears 
as a threat to them. His commitment activated the agenda for a referendum about 
membership, which is now going to be discussed.  
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4. Contemporary British euroscepticism 
The contemporary British political arena, especially the groups in it, is discussing the EU 
issue on a regular basis and it is at the forefront of British contemporary politics. Media 
outlets, academics and, in some ways, the government pay a great deal of attention to the 
possible in-out referendum and the rising popularity of extremist parties. The populist, 
single issue party UKIP is now playing a big role in the public domain and defines 
changes in attitude towards the EU. The growing scepticism in parliament and the 
changing stance of the government show the impact that this political party has had. 
However, the electoral system and the lack of financial resources has hindered UKIP's 
attempts to gain seats in the House of Commons and thus directly influence Britain's 
European policy.  
Furthermore, it is important to understand that the contemporary government is 
composed of two different parties, which, as a result of their coalition, have been forced 
to change their stances. The Conservative Party seems to be a soft Eurosceptic body, the 
leader of which describes himself as a pragmatic and sensible Eurosceptic. He 
emphasized his attitude in a speech, which discussed the challenges Britain faces as 
regards Europe and appealed to the EU about the need for reforms (Lynch 2011: 222). 
On the other hand, their partners, the Liberal Democrats, have constantly been pro-
European and oppose discussions about reforms, especially the possibility of a 
referendum about membership.22 
The British Conservative Party today is more likely to be Eurosceptical. This is directly 
related to how they see Britain’s foreign policy and its place in the world. Given their 
lack of sympathy for the EU, they are compelled to steer Britain into the American 
sphere of influence. This is why their emphasis lies in NATO as the main defence 
structure of the EU and their “special relationship” or “Atlanticism” has played too key a 
part in British diplomatic history, to the detriment of maintaining a close engagement in 
European matters. However, the US and other significant players in the world game want 
to see Britain as a part of the EU. This controversial situation appeals to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Watt, Nicolas (2013). David Cameron challenges Nick Clegg over EU referendum. The Guardian. 30. 06. 2013 
[cit. 10. 04. 2014]. Available from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jun/30/david-cameron-nick-clegg-eu-
referendum. 
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contemporary government and complicates its policy and attitude towards the European 
Union (Beech 2011: 353).   
 
4.1. Factors related to the active presence of this phenomenon on the 
British political arena 
Euroscepticism in Britain has existed throughout the whole membership period, however 
the purpose of this subchapter is to describe factors related to its presence in the 
contemporary political arena and to suggest the possibility of holding a membership 
referendum. 
The first factor of contemporary euroscepticism is the presence and active influence of 
the populist parties, such as the Scottish National Party, UKIP, and the British National 
Party. The most influential party regarding the European issue is the United Kingdom 
Independence Party, which represents the right wing populist movement and was created 
in 1992 and founded in 1993 as a reaction to Europe’s federalist project of creating an 
even closer political and economic union made possible by the Maastricht Treaty23. 
However, the party roots can be dated back to the Bruges speech, which led to the 
creation of the Bruges group and a highly diffused opposition to European integration. 
From the outset, the party was a part of the Anti-federalist League, but their leader, Alan 
Sked, and his small group of followers launched a new structure with new policies, a new 
logo and new aims. The main aim was “to put pressure on the British government of the 
day by not taking up any European Parliament seats it might win” (Usherwood 2010: 5–
6). 
During the 1990s and the first part of the 21st century, UKIP performed badly during the 
elections to the European and British Parliaments. However, the first change was seen in 
the 2004 EP elections, when the party began to contest local elections on the basis of 
environment and libertarian values. Furthermore, it began to invest more effort into 
developing policy beyond EU withdrawal. This was shown in the development of an 
immigration and asylum policy (see Appendix 1) (Usherwood 2010: 9-10). Nigel Farage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 PressTV (2013). UK Independence Party & policies; an overview. 08. 05. 2013. [cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available 
from http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/05/08/302487/ukip/. 
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gained even more success in the 2009 EP election, when the party won 13 seats and came 
second to the Conservatives in terms of votes won.24 (see Appendix 1) 
In May 2014, the European Parliament election was held, in which UKIP came in first 
place and won 24 seats ahead of the Conservatives and Labour on 18 seats each.25 For 
this election, UKIP published two version of its Manifesto 2014, which is representing 
party’s electoral campaign both for EP and local elections. Their European program, also 
called Manifesto 2014, has a slightly different nature. In this document, the main 
emphasis lies in the prediction that if voters choose UKIP, the party would actively and 
effectively negotiate an immediate withdrawal from the EU. Their arguments challenge 
the policies and arguments of traditional and influential British parties26 who have stated 
that UK withdrawal from the EU will cost Britain too much. The manifesto calls for a re-
imagination of the real economic and trade situation with the EU, which only damages 
Britain and takes jobs and money from the state. UKIP also argues that the fuel and 
energy economic sector of Britain is under threat from European laws and restrictions. 
According to this document, independence will bring many positive effects and make the 
country wealthier and stronger both economically and nationally.27 The change in voting 
preferences shows a public concern about the European Union, which has not delivered 
upon the predicted potential economic growth. People want to have jobs, high wages and 
new houses whilst also taking social benefits from the state in the form of better free 
education and health care. However, EU bodies and UK governing parties could not 
deliver these goods for people. In such situations, voters turn to populist parties, which 
sometimes appear more effective than traditional ones.28    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 PressTV (2013). UK Independence Party & policies; an overview. 08. 05. 2013. [cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available 
from http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/05/08/302487/ukip/. 
25Osborn, Andrew – Faulconbridge, Guy (2014). UK's Eurosceptic UKIP party storms to victory in Europe vote. 
Reuters. 26.05.2014 [cit. 11.07.2014]. Available from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/26/us-eu-elections-
britain-idUSBREA4O0EM20140526. 
26 Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Labour Party 
27  UKIP (2014). Manifesto 2014: Create an earthquake [cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available from 
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/themes/5308a93901925b5b09000002/attachments/original/1398167812/Euro
ManifestoMarch.pdf?1398167812. 
28 Kellner, Peter (2014). European elections: UKIP closes in on first place. University of Cambridge. 16. 01. 2014 
[cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available from http://cambridge.yougov.com/news/2014/01/16/european-elections-ukip-closes-
first-place/. 
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The second factor of the active eurosceptic movement is the speech made by D.Cameron, 
which was described in the previous subchapter, and the eurosceptic part of the 
Conservative party. After UKIP’s victory, Conservative eurosceptic lawmakers are now 
likely to increase their calls for Cameron to bring forward his promised EU referendum 
by a year. In addition, Cameron's Conservatives have promised new measures to curb 
immigration from the European Union in an effort to appease UKIP voters after losing 
hundreds of seats in local polls.29 
These factors have lead to the possibility of a referendum about membership, which was 
first mentioned by David Cameron in 2013 and is now the hottest issue in British foreign 
policy. 
 
4.2. The possibility of a referendum on membership of the EU 
The question of a referendum was raised in January 2013 by David Cameron, when the 
Prime Minister promised that one would be held if the Conservative Party wins an 
outright majority in the next general election. The reaction from Parliament and MPs was 
immediate. Cameron's promise created a visible satisfaction among the most 
Conservative members, who had been split on the issue.30 The Conservatives published a 
bill aimed at reassuring the party's MPs by outlining plans for a referendum by the end of 
2017. The bill states that voters would be asked the question "Do you think that the 
United Kingdom should remain a member of the European Union?" in a referendum to be 
held no later than 31 December 2017. However, other parties have not expressed great 
support for this step and this is visible from the fact that neither the Liberal Democrats, 
nor Labour have proposed similar bills. Both leaders (Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg) 
reminded political parties that David Cameron and the Conservatives are wrong in both 
their speeches and the bill’s proposals, and that it was a big mistake to pledge support in 
the past. They believe that the United Kingdom should remain in the EU and make an 
attempt to reform it, rather than leave.31  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Osborn, Andrew – Faulconbridge, Guy (2014). UK's Eurosceptic UKIP party storms to victory in Europe vote. 
Reuters. 26.05.2014 [cit. 11.07.2014]. Available from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/26/us-eu-elections-
britain-idUSBREA4O0EM20140526.	  
30 RTE News (2013). David Cameron pledges EU referendum if Conservatives win next elections. 24. 01. 2013 [cit. 
22. 07. 2014]. Available from http://www.rte.ie/news/2013/0123/364037-david-cameron-eu/. 
31 BBC (2013). David Cameron: EU referendum bill shows only Tories listen. 14. 05. 2013 [cit. 22. 07. 2014]. 
Available from http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-22530655. 
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Moreover, Conservative eurosceptics have tried to push through an early referendum. 
The amendment’s proposal was brought by Conservative backbencher Adam Afriyie, 
who believes that “[a] 2014 vote was the only way to guarantee that the British people 
would get their say on our relations with the EU and show that as Conservatives, we 
were listening to the public”.32 However, the attempt failed and the Commons voted 
against it.  
The very existence of this bill could foreshadow the possibility of a referendum, but there 
is a question as to how MPs would vote in 2016 and whether the Conservatives will win 
a majority in the Commons during the next general election.  
Still, there are two other factors existing within the British political arena and public life, 
which can influence political actions regarding a membership referendum. Firstly, 
newspapers and opinion polls, during their research into people's opinions on 
membership of the EU, are discovering that society is divided into two groups as regards 
the European question. Near half of the respondents believe that withdrawal from the 
European Union will benefit Britain, and the other half believes that this step will bring 
only disadvantages. However, it is also important to note that nearly 20% of respondents 
do not know how to react and vote 33 (see Appendix 2). From Appendix 2 it is also 
evident that Britain has persisted in its contemporary situation for a long time. From the 
thesis’ arguments, the conclusion can also be drawn that the trend of scepticism towards 
the EU has existed among the British public since the early 1990s, but that no governing 
parties have been able to overcome this crisis, making their policies ineffective.  
According to the definition of democracy, members of a society may be directly involved 
in deciding on the laws and policies of that society or they can select representatives to 
make the decisions. However, the elected power should act in accordance with the will of 
the people and should take note of and respond to all of the society’s concerns.34 In 
situations when the public has not agreed with the political elite, they have turned to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Mason, Rowena (2013). MPs reject early EU referendum. The Guardian. 22. 10. 2013 [cit. 11. 04. 2014]. 
Available from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/ 22/mps-rejects-early-europe-referendum. 
33  YouGov (2014). EU referendum [cit. 22. 07. 2014]. Available from 
http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/uxyleagym8/YG-Archives-Pol-Trackers-Europe-
Referendum-210714.pdf. 
34 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006). Democracy. 27. 07. 2006 [cit. 22. 07. 2014]. Available from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/#DemDef. 
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populist parties such as UKIP or the Scottish Independence Party in Britain in the hope 
that their needs will be met (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 256). 
The United Kingdom Independence party’s victory in the EP elections has raised a few 
questions around the European issue and has confirmed this theory. In their manifesto for 
the European Parliament elections, UKIP promised voters an immediate withdrawal, 
which would be achieved by putting pressure on the government, pushing through a 
referendum and negotiating with the EU’s decision-making bodies.35 This triumph forced 
eurosceptic Conservative lawmakers into action resulting in them now being likely to 
increase their calls for Cameron to bring forward his promised EU referendum by a year. 
The party also promised new measures to curb immigration from the European Union, 
which appears to be the main reason for their growing support. This was done in an effort 
to appease the populist party’s voters after losing hundreds of seats in local polls.36 
Should the referendum indeed happen, each of these factors could be held partly 
responsible. However, it is impossible to accurately predict any decision made in the 
Commons or the results of actions taken by the political elite. In Britain's case, it is most 
likely that the political elite will soften this process as they did it in the 1970s and again 
in the 1990s. With the possibility of a referendum still high, the timing of it could once 
again play a big role. Wilson’s approach from the 1970s may be copied, which is why the 
referendum will not be held until the data from opinion polls and surveys about leaving 
the EU remains so high.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  UKIP (2014). Manifesto 2014: Create an earthquake [cit. 08. 04. 2014]. Available from 
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/themes/5308a93901925b5b09000002/attachments/original/1398167812/Euro
ManifestoMarch.pdf?1398167812. 
36 Osborn, Andrew – Faulconbridge, Guy (2014). UK's Eurosceptic UKIP party storms to victory in Europe vote. 
Reuters. 26.05.2014 [cit. 11.07.2014]. Available from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/26/us-eu-elections-
britain-idUSBREA4O0EM20140526. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this bachelor thesis is to analyze British relations with the European Union 
during the last four decades, particularly as regards euroscepticism within specific 
governments. The main research question was intended to discover whether there has 
been a linear or non-linear growth of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the thesis attempts 
to identify the periods of growth in euroscepticism. An additional research question 
contained within this thesis addresses a possible British referendum on EU membership.  
Firstly, it was necessary to get relevant resources for the theoretical part, which includes 
descriptions of euroscepticism given by different authors, and then to choose one 
appropriate definition to apply to a study of recent British governments. The chosen 
definition of euroscepticism, used by this thesis, is based on the dichotomy created by 
famous researchers: Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, in which they divided this 
movement into two groups. The first group is made up of opponents of particular EU 
policies, while the second one is focused on withdrawal from the EU. Different 
governments were classified as eurosceptic bodies in accordance with this definition. 
Moreover, the thesis develops the concept of operationalization, which helps to examine, 
whether particular executive governments were eurosceptic, or not. In addition, there is 
one more important feature of this thesis. In light of the absence of euroscepticism on an 
executive level, the work examines the opponents of European integration and describes 
their influence on British foreign policy.  
By drawing conclusions based on the thesis’ analysis, it is clear that the eurosceptic trend 
has a nonlinear growth. The first indicator that some people were critical of membership 
of the EC, later to become the EU, came to light soon after the country joined the 
Community. Eurosceptical politicians became a part of both Parliament and the Cabinet, 
and they openly expressed and fought for their ideas. It was a period, when the Prime 
Minister and his assistants felt the need to close the question of membership legitimacy. 
The cornerstone of this fight was a referendum in 1975, when the British public decided 
to remain in the Community and supported the decision taken by Parliament. The second 
half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s demonstrated a decline in 
euroscepticism at the executive level. The voices of the sceptics were quiet after the 
defeat in the 1975 referendum and shortly thereafter the biggest group of them, known as 
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the soft eurosceptics, began to believe in Margaret Thatcher’s ability to move Britain in 
the direction of European integration for the purposes of British prosperity. However, 
concerns began to grow during the negotiations upon the adoption of the Maastricht 
Treaty in the 1990s. Miscellaneous sceptical groups influenced John Major’s government 
by making him unable to act or to make any significant decisions. The Prime Minister 
was confronted by the strong voices of eurosceptics, who wanted a UK withdrawal from 
the European Union. Later, in 1997, Major's government seemed to be a “lame duck”37, 
and his successor, Tony Blair, attempted to go against the grain. As a result, the Labour 
government at the time can be described as a non-eurosceptical executive body, because 
they tried to create a strategy which was more in favour of integration into the European 
Union by using discursive methods. The Labour Party used eurosceptic arguments, but 
turned them in favor of European integration and this method was effective during the 
early years of its tenure. However, the situation did not change greatly as opposition in 
the Commons still existed and was quite active. Blair and later Brown failed to disable 
the euroscepticism movement and to deliver an integrationist policy. One of the 
important factors in this failure was the disagreement between Britain and the European 
Union member countries during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, when Blair’s 
government failed to reach a consensus with the European Union. The second critical 
point was the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which has led to an active phase of euro-
scepticism. The eurosceptic movement is now reaching its peak with David Cameron’s 
speech on Europe, growing electorate support for right-wing populist parties and 
proposals about a referendum.  
Therefore, this thesis outlines the six periods of euroscepticism namely 1970 – 1975, a 
period of activity among Anti-Marketeers and the Heath-Wilson strategy towards 
Europe; 1975 – 1989, a period of inactivity among the sceptics and Thatcher’s approach; 
1989 – 1997, the effective activities developed by the eurosceptic movement at the 
executive level; 1997 – 2003, Labour’s welcoming strategy towards the EU; 2003 – 
2009, the crisis and disillusionment with the EU; 2009 – nowadays, the pinnacle of 
contemporary euroscepticism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Lame duck” – in politics this term means an elected official who is approaching the end of his tenure, especially 
one whose successor has already been elected (The Free Dictionary 2014). 
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The secondary goal of this thesis was to predict the possibility of a referendum about EU 
membership, which may be held in the next three years. This goal was not fully achieved, 
because it is impossible to predict with complete certainty something which has not yet 
happened. However, this work tries to find reasons why the referendum should be held 
and, based on these facts, supposes the possibility of the referendum.  
There are three factors, which may lead the government to announce a referendum about 
continued membership. The first of these is the growing electoral support of right wing 
populist parties, which could lead to a government crisis and the crisis of the 
Westminster system in general. Secondly, high public concerns about the EU related to 
the principles of the democracy should be addressed. From the data gathered in opinion 
polls, it has become clear that British society has problems with European integration and 
that there is a need for a new approach towards Europe, which would deal with these 
worries. The third and final factor is the eurosceptic nature of the Conservative Party, 
which has been developing since Margaret Thatcher first term of office, and is now 
manifesting itself in its leader’s speeches, bill proposals and party commitments to 
membership terms. 
Relations between the United Kingdom and the European Community, now called the 
European Union, has always been affected by eurosceptic concerns. Unfortunately, 
British executive bodies have never created a satisfactory strategy, which would both 
satisfy social worries and drastically change the British attitude towards European 
integration. It is a challenge for future governments to learn from the mistakes made by 
their predecessors and to develop the next British policy regarding the EU. 
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7. Abstract 
The subject of this bachelor thesis is the Analysis of British relations with the European 
Union during the last four decades. The main question posed by this work concerns 
whether Britain is becoming increasingly Eurosceptical and if it will eventually be the 
referendum on membership of the Union. 
The first part explains the key terms and gives general information about the 
phenomenon, and moreover discusses the British version of Euroscepticism in scientific 
terms. The practical part of the work considers different government attitudes towards the 
EU and tries to pinpoint the reason for the increasing popularity of Euroscepticism over 
the last four decades. This thesis works with six periods of euroscepticism namely 1970 – 
1975, a period of activity among Anti-Marketeers and the Heath-Wilson strategy towards 
Europe; 1975 – 1989, a period of inactivity among the sceptics and Thatcher’s approach; 
1989 – 1997, the effective activities developed by the eurosceptic movement at the 
executive level; 1997 – 2003, Labour’s welcoming strategy towards the EU; 2003 – 
2009, the crisis and disillusionment with the EU; 2009 – nowadays, the pinnacle of 
contemporary euroscepticism. 
The main goal of this thesis is to provide analysis of Britain's contemporary policy 
towards the EU, discover how this phenomenon has developed and become so popular 
today, and of course discuss a membership referendum if one is indeed held in the future.  	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8. Resumé 
Tématem této bakalářské práce je „Analýza britských vztahů s Evropskou unií během 
posledních čtyř desetiletí“, kde centrální otázkou je, jestli se Velká Británie stává stále 
více euroskeptickou a zda se bude konat referendum o členství v Evropské unii.  
První část práce vysvětluje základní pojmy a přináší obecné informace o zkoumaném 
jevu, kromě toho se zabývá britskou verzí euroskepticismu s ohledem na vědeckou teorii. 
Praktická část práce se dívá na postoj různých vlád vůči Evropské unii a snaží se 
vystihnout popularitu euroskeptického směru v průběhu posledních čtyř desetiletí. Táto 
práce se zabývá šesti periody euroskepticismu, které jsou pojmenované jako 1970 – 
1975, období aktivit odpůrců společného trhu a Heathová-Wilsonová strategie vůči 
Evropě; 1975 – 1989, období klidu mezi skeptiky a přístup Thatcherové; 1989 – 1997, 
úspěch euroskeptického hnutí na vládní úrovni; 1997 – 2003, Labouristická strategie 
vítání vůči Evropě; 2003 – 2009, krize a zklamání s EU; 2009 – dodnes, vrchol 
soudobého euroskepticismu. 
Hlavním cílem  práce je poskytnout analýzu současné britské politiky vůči EU, zjistit, jak 
soudobý euroskepticismus vznikl, a co vedlo k jeho popularitě, a diskutovat možnost 
konání referenda o členství v EU. 	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9. Appendices 
Appendix 1. 
UKIP’s Electoral preferences 
Election Percent of Vote  Number of Seats 
1997 General Election 0.3 (105, 722) 0 
1999 EP Election 6.9 (696, 057) 3 
2001 General Election 1.5 (390, 563) 0 
2004 EP Election 16.1 (2, 660, 768) 12 
2005 General Election 2.2 (603, 298) 0 
2009 EP Election 16.5 (2, 498, 226) 13 
Resource: White, Michael 2013. 
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Appendix 2. 
YouGov opinion polls about EU referendum 
If there was a referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union, how 
would you vote? 
 Remain in EU Leave EU Wouldn't vote Don't know 
2014 % % % % 
July 17-18 38 39 6 17 
July 13-14 41 38 5 16 
June 29-30 40 39 5 16 
June 26-27 39 37 6 18 
June 19-20 39 39 6 15 
June 15-16 44 36 5 15 
May 29-30 41 39 5 15 
May 20-21 42 37 5 16 
May 18-19 43 37 4 16 
April 24-25 40 37 5 18 
April 21-22 40 38 6 17 
April 3-4 42 37 5 16 
March 27-28 42 36 5 16 
March 23-24 42 36 5 17 
March 9-10 41 39 5 15 
February 9-10 36 39 7 18 
January 12-13 33 43 5 19 
2013     
December 1-9 37 43 4 16 
November 10- 39 39 5 17 
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11 
October 13-14 37 42 5 15 
September 
15-16 39 42 4 16 
August 18-19 34 46 5 15 
August 4-5 35 43 5 17 
July 22-23 35 45 6 15 
July 7-8 36 43 5 16 
June 23-24 31 45 6 18 
June 9-10 35 43 5 17 
May 28-29 35 43 5 17 
May 12-13 34 44 4 17 
May 9-10 30 47 4 19 
May 7 35 46 4 16 
April 21-22 35 43 5 17 
April 7-8 36 43 7 14 
March 25-26 33 44 5 19 
February 17-
18 38 41 5 15 
January 24-25 37 39 5 19 
January 23-24 38 40 4 18 
January 20-21 37 40 6 18 
January 17-18 40 34 5 20 
January 10-11 36 42 4 17 
January 2-3 31 46 6 16 
2012     
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November 27-
28 30 51 5 14 
October 22-23 28 49 5 17 
September 
25-26 33 47 7 14 
August 28-29 32 47 7 15 
July 23-24 30 49 7 14 
July 5-6 31 48 4 17 
June 26-27 33 47 6 14 
May 17-18 28 51 6 15 
April 16-17 32 48 6 13 
March 25-26 34 44 5 18 
February 13-
14 30 48 6 17 
January 24-26 34 44 5 18 
2011     
December 15-
16 41 41 5 14 
December 11-
12 36 43 4 17 
December 8-9 35 44 5 15 
October 23-24 32 51 4 13 
August 7-8 30 52 4 15 
2010     
September 8-
9 33 47 5 14 
 
Resource: YouGov 2014.  
 
